Abstract. The paper studies hereditarily complete superintuitionistic deductive systems, that is, the deductive system which logic is an extension of the intuitionistic propositional logic. It is proven that for deductive systems a criterion of hereditary structurality -similar to one that exists for logics -does not exists. Nevertheless, it is proven that many standard superintuitionistic logics (including Int) can be defined by a hereditarily structurally complete deductive system.
Introduction
The notion of structural completeness was introduced by W. Pogorzelski in [20] : a (propositional) deductive system 1 S is structurally complete if every admissible in S rule is derivable in S (and we denote this by S ∈ SC).
First, let us clarify the above definition. Let For be a set of all (propositional) formulas built in a usual way from an infinite countable set P of (propositional) variables and from a finite set C of connectives. A (structural) rule is an ordered pair Γ B, where Γ is a finite (maybe empty) set of formulas, and B is a formula. Deductive system is understood as a pair ⟨Ax , R⟩, where Ax is a set of formulas and R is a set of rules. And each deductive system S defines in a natural way a consequence relation denoted by ⊢ S and a logic {A ∈ For ∶ ⊢ S A} denoted by L(S). Given a deductive system S ∶= ⟨Ax , R⟩, a rule r ∶= Γ B is admissible in S if L(S) = L(⟨Ax , R + r⟩), and r is derivable in S if Γ ⊢ S B, that is, if ⊢ ⟨Ax ,R⟩ = ⊢ ⟨Ax ,R+r⟩ . In other words, a rule r is admissible in a deductive system S if extending R by r does not change the logic of S, while r is derivable in S if extending R by r does not change derivability in S.
For instance, let us consider classical deductive system (calculus) S c ∶= ⟨Ax c , mp⟩, where Ax c is a set of classical axiom schemes and mp ∶= A, A → B B is Modus Ponens (see e.g. [18] [Section 1.4]); and let us consider intuitionistic deductive system S c ∶= ⟨Ax i , mp⟩, where Ax i is a set of intuitionistic axiom schemes (see e.g. [18] [Section 1.6]). A consequence relation ⊢ Sc is structurally complete, while consequence relation ⊢ S i is not structurally complete, for the rule ¬p → (q ∨ r) (¬p → q) ∨ (¬p → r) is admissible in ⊢ S i but not derivable in it.
Soon after the notion of structural completeness had been introduced, Dzik and Wronski observed [10] that not only the deductive system S l ∶= ⟨Ax i + ((p → q) ∨ (q → p)), mp⟩ is structurally complete, but all its extensions are structurally complete too; that is, S l is hereditarily structurally complete (and we denote this by S l ∈ HSCpl). In [9] Citkin had obtained a criterion of hereditary structural completeness for the deductive systems ⟨Ax , mp⟩, where Ax i ⊆ Ax . Later, in [23] Rybakov had proven a similar criterion for normal extensions of modal logic K4. More recently, Olson, Raftery and van Alten (see [19] ) had established hereditarily structural completeness for a range of substructural logics. For fuzzy logics and their fragments the hereditary structural completeness was studied by Cintula and Metcalfe [6] . In [27] S lomczyńska proved that {↔, ¬¬}-fragment of intuitionistic propositional calculus is hereditarily structural complete.
Let us note that admissibility of a rule in a deductive system depends exclusively on the logic of the system: a rule Γ B is admissible in a deductive system S if and only if for every (uniform) substitution σ (of formulas for variables) we have σ(B) ∈ L(S) as long as σ(A) ∈ L(S) for every A ∈ Γ. Hence, if r is admissible in ⟨Ax , R⟩, it is admissible in ⟨Ax , R + r⟩ too, and L(⟨Ax , R⟩) = L(⟨Ax , R + r⟩). Thus, for every deductive system S ∶= ⟨Ax , R⟩ there is a structurally complete deductive systemS having the same logic as S and in which all admissible in S rules are derivable: we can takeS = ⟨Ax ,R⟩, whereR is the set of all rules admissible in S. Naturally,S is structurally complete, and we say thatS is a structural completion 2 of S. Clearly, a deductive system S is structurally complete if and only if S =S. Moreover, given a logic L, we can consider a deductive systemL ∶= ⟨L,R⟩, whereR is the set of all rules admissible in L, and we say thatL is a structural completion of logic L.
As we know, the structural completion of a logic is, of course, structurally complete. On the other hand, every hereditarily structural complete deductive system S is a structural completion of its logic L(S). Thus, if we want study the hereditarily structural complete deductive systems, it is natural to ask structural completions of which logics are hereditarily structural complete. In this paper we focus primarily on superintuitionistic logics, that is on logics extending intuitionistic propositional logic Int .
First (in Section 2) we consider some general properties of hereditarily structurally complete deductive systems. Then, in Section 3, we recall definitions and properties of admissible and derivable rules. Section 4 is dedicated to studying hereditarily structurally complete deductive systems, and here we prove the main theorem (Theorem 4.9) that establishes a link between hereditary structural completeness and inheritance of the bases of admissible rules. And then (in Section 5) we consider some well known superintuitionistic logics from the standpoint of hereditary structural completeness of their structural completions. Some results are summarized in the Table 1 (where L ∈ HSCpl means ⟨L, mp⟩ ∈ HSCpl). 
Deductive Systems and Consequence Relations
2.1. Deductive Systems. In this section we recall the basic properties of (propositional) deductive systems and their links to consequence relations.
Language. A propositional language L is understood as a finite set of connectives with specified finite arities. The notion of L-formula over a fixed countably infinite set of propositional variables P is defined in the usual manner. For denotes the set of all L-formulas. A mapping σ ∶ P → For is called a substitution. If σ is a substitution and A is a formula, by σ(A) we denote a result of simultaneous replacement of each occurring of variable p in A with σ(p). If Γ is a set of formulas, by σ(Γ) we denote a set {σ(A) ∶ A ∈ Γ}. We say that a formula B is a substitution instance of a formula A if there is a substitution σ such that B = σ(A).
Inference Rules. An ordered couple ⟨Γ, A⟩, where Γ ⊆ For is a finite (maybe empty) set of formulas and A ∈ For is a formula, is called a (structural inference) rule. We use a more custom notation: Γ A. Formulas Γ are called premises, while formula A is called a conclusion. The set of all rules we denote by Rls.
If r ∶= Γ A is a rule and σ is a substitution, then σ(Γ) σ(A) is said to be a σ-substitution instance of rule r (denoted by σ(r)) and we omit reference to a particular substitution when no confusion arises.
Deductive System. An ordered couple ⟨Ax , R⟩, where Ax ⊆ For and R ⊆ Rls are non-empty sets respectively of formulas and of rules, is called a deductive system. Let S = ⟨Ax , R⟩ be a deductive system. Then Ax is a set of axioms of S and R is a set of rules of S. And, given a finite set of formulas Γ and a formula A, a sequence of formulas B 1 , . . . , B n is called an S-inference of A from Γ if the following holds (i1) B n = A; (i2) for all i = 1, . . . , n either B i ∈ Γ, or B i is a substitution instance of an axiom from Ax , or there is a substitution instance ∆ B i of a rule from R such that ∆ ⊆ {B 1 , . . . , B i−1 }. If there is an S-inference of A from Γ, we say that A is an S-consequence of Γ and we denote this by Γ ⊢ S A. If Γ = ∅, we write ⊢ S A and say that A is S-derivable or that A is an S-theorem. The set of all S-theorems is called a logic of deductive system S, and we denote this set by L(S). 
Let us note that relation ⊢ S for a given deductive system S satisfies the above definition and, hence, ⊢ S is a consequence relation defined by S. On the other hand, given a consequence relation ⊢, one can take a deductive system S ∶= ⟨{A ∈ For ∶ ⊢ A}, {Γ B ∈ Rls ∶ Γ ⊢ B}⟩ and verify that ⊢ S = ⊢, that is, every consequence relation can be defined by a deductive system. Given two consequence relations ⊢ and ⊢ ′ we say that
It is clear that the set of all extensions of a given consequence relation is closed under arbitrary meets, and, therefore, it forms a complete lattice. An extension ⊢ ′ of a consequence relation ⊢ is said to be axiomatic if there is a set of formulas Γ such that ⊢ ′ is the smallest extension of ⊢ having every formula from Γ as a theorem. In terms of deductive systems, ⊢ ′ is an axiomatic extension of ⊢ S , where S ∶= ⟨Ax , R⟩, if ⊢ ′ can be defined by a deductive system ⟨Ax + Γ, R⟩ for some Γ ⊆ For (comp. [19] ). Let S 1 and S 2 be deductive systems. We say that S 2 is logical extension of S 1 (in symbols
; and we say that S 2 is a deductive extension of S 1 (and we denote this by
We also say that S 1 and S 2 are logically equal (in symbols
, and S 1 and S 2 are deductively equal and we write
Example 2.3. For instance, IPC ⪅ CPC. Moreover, CPC is an axiomatic extension of IPC: one can take Γ = {(¬¬p → p)}.
Let us note the following, rather simple property that we will need in the sequel.
Proposition 2.4. Let S ∶= ⟨Ax , R⟩ be a deductive system. Then ⟨Ax , R⟩ ≈ ⟨L(S), R⟩.
This proposition simply means that extending the set of axioms by formulas derived in S does not change the consequence relation defined by S.
Proof. The proof immediately follows from the definition of inference. Indeed, let A 1 , . . . , A k , . . . , A n be an inference of A n from a set of formulas Γ and A k ∈ L(S). Then there is an inference B 1 , . . . , B m , A k of A k from the empty set of formulas. Immediately from the definition of inference we can see that A 1 , . . . , B 1 , . . . , B m , A k , . . . , A n is an inference of A n from Γ. Thus, any inference in ⟨L(S), R⟩ can be converted into an inference in S.
Admissible and Derivable Rules
The goal of this section is to recall the notions of admissibility and derivability of rules in deductive systems.
3.1. Admissible Rules. We start by recalling the notion of a rule admissible in a given deductive system. Definition 3.1. Let S ∶= ⟨Ax , R⟩ be a deductive system. A rule r is called admissible in S, or in the corresponding consequence relation
If S = ⟨Ax , R⟩ is a deductive system, byR(S) we denote the set of all rules admissible in S. Since adding an admissible rule to a deductive system does not change the logic of this system and all rules from R are trivially admissible in S (that is, R ⊆R(S)), we have
The following Proposition gives a well known alternative intrinsic characterization of admissibility.
Proposition 3.3. A rule r ∶= Γ A is admissible in a deductive system S if and only if for every
Assume that (ADM) holds. By simple induction on length of inference one can demonstrate that any S ′ -inference from ∅ is, by the same token, an S-inference from ∅. Thus, L(S ′ ) ⊆ L(S). Now, assume that (ADM) does not hold and suppose Γ = {A 1 , . . . , A n }.
Thus, admissibility of rules depends only on logic, that is, the following holds. 
whereR(S i ) denotes the set of all rules admissible in S i , i = 0, 1.
Since deductive equality yields logical equality, due to the above Proposition, we can speak about admissibility of a rule for a consequence relation, because, if a rule r is admissible in S, then r is admissible in every deductively equal to S system, that is, in every deductive system defining ⊢ S . Proposition 3.5. Let ⊢ be a consequence relation and r be a rule. Then the following is equivalent (a) r is admissible for ⊢ ; (b) r is admissible in some deductive system defining ⊢; (c) r is admissible in every deductive system defining ⊢.
If S ∶= ⟨Ax , R⟩ is a deductive system, byR(S) we denote the set of all rules admissible in S, and by ∼ S we denote the consequence relation defined by deductive system ⟨Ax ,R(S)⟩. Let us observe that ∼ S is the greatest consequence relation having L(S) as its set of theorems.
3.2. Derivable Rules. Let S ∶= ⟨Ax , R⟩ be a deductive system. Definition 3.6. If r ∶= Γ A is a rule and Γ ⊢ S A, we say that r is derivable in S, or that r is S-derivable. R(S) denotes a set of all S-derivable rules.
Example 3.7. Every admissible in CPC rule is derivable in CPC, while Harrop rule is admissible and not derivable in IPC.
It is clear that every derivable in S rule is admissible in S, that is, R(S) ⊆ R(S), but not necessarily vice versa, as we see from the above example.
This proposition simply means that extending the set of rules by the derivable in S rules does not change the consequence relation defined by S.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 2.4.
The definition of derivability can be rephrased in terms of consequence relations: given a consequence relation ⊢, a rule Γ A is ⊢-derivable if Γ ⊢ A. Let us note that the following holds.
Proposition 3.9. Let ⊢ be a consequence relation and r be a rule. Then the following is equivalent (a) r is ⊢-derivable; (b) r is derivable in some deductive system defining ⊢; (c) r is derivable in every deductive system defining ⊢.
The proof is easy and it is left for the reader. Thus, if r is a rule and S ∶= ⟨Ax , R⟩ is a deductive system, r is admissible in S if and only if ⟨Ax , R + r⟩ ∼ ⟨Ax , R⟩, and r is derivable in S if and only if ⟨Ax , R + r⟩ ≈ ⟨Ax , R⟩.
3.3.
Base of Admissible Rules. One of the common ways of defining the set of all rules admissible in a given deductive system S ∶= ⟨Ax , R⟩ is to present a base, that is, a set of admissible rules from which every admissible in S rule can be derived. The following simple proposition shows the relations between relative bases and bases. Proposition 3.11. Let S ∶= ⟨Ax , R⟩ be a deductive system and R ′ be a relative to S base of admissible rules. Then R + R ′ forms a base of admissible in S rules.
On the other hand, by assumption and by (1) , keeping in mind that deductive equality yields logical equality, we have ⟨Ax ,
Example 3.12. As it had been observed in [14] , the rules V n , n = 1, 2, . . . form relative to IPC base for admissible (in IPC) rules:
Rules V n are knows as the Visser's rules. The set of the Visser's rules together with Modus Ponens forms also a base of admissible in IPC rules.
Naturally, any two logically (and, therefore, any two deductively) equal systems share the base of admissible rules. In other words, the base of admissible rules depends only on logic and does not depend on a particular deductive system defining this logic. The proof is trivial: by assumption,
Structural Completeness
In this section we recall the notions of structural and hereditary structural completeness, and we prove the main theorem (Theorem 4.9) that establishes a link between hereditary structural completeness and inheritance of a base of admissible rules.
4.1. Structural Completeness: Definition. The notion of structural completeness was introduced in [20] and is central for our research. Immediately from Propositions 3.5 and 3.9 we obtain the following. The next Proposition gives an alternative intrinsic definition of structural completeness, and often it is used as a definition (see e.g. [1, 19, 6] ).
Proposition 4.4. A consequence relation ⊢ is structurally complete if and only if every its proper extension ⊢
′ contains the new theorems, i.e.
Proof. Suppose that ⊢ is a structurally complete consequence relation and let ⊢ ′ be a consequence relation and ⊢ < ⊢ ′ . Due to ⊢ is structurally complete, every admissible, that is every preserving T h(⊢), rule is ⊢-derivable. Hence, ⊢ cannot have the same set of theorems as ⊢. Thus, (4.1) holds.
Conversely, assume that 4.1 holds and R is a set of all derivable in ⊢ rules. Then ⊢ = ⊢ S , where S ∶= ⟨T h(⊢), R⟩. If S is not structurally complete, there would be an admissible in S but not S-derivable rule r. Consider deductive system S r ∶= ⟨T h(⊢), R + r⟩. Due to r is admissible in S, we have T h(S) = T h(S r ). Due to r is not S-derivable, we have ⊢ S < ⊢ S r .
Structural Completions.
It is worth noting that every deductive system S ∶= ⟨Ax , R⟩ can be extended to a logically equal structurally complete deductive system. Indeed, denote byR(S) the set of all rules admissible in S, and take deductive systemS ∶= ⟨Ax ,R(S)⟩. It is clear that S ∼S. Let us observe thatS is the greatest relative to ⪅ system among deductive systems logically equal to S. More precisely, the following holds. 
Proof. Let S ∶= ⟨Ax , R⟩ and S
Then, due to every derivable rule is admissible and by (1), we have Immediately from the definition it follows that any deductive extension of a hereditarily structurally complete deductive system is hereditarily structurally complete. At the same time, there are structurally complete deductive systems which are not hereditarily structurally complete (see e.g. [9] ).
The following theorem gives some alternative views at hereditary structural completeness. Let us note that if a deductive system S is hereditarily structural complete, then S is structural completion of a deductive system. Thus, it is natural to ask for a given deductive system S whether its structural completioñ S is hereditarily complete. The next theorem gives some necessary and sufficient conditions of hereditarily structural completeness of the structural completion of a deductive system. Proof of (a). By assumption, R b is a relative basis for S, that is,
By (1) and (4) we also have
Recall that S ′ is a deductive extension of S, therefore,
At the same time, S b was obtained from S ′ by adding to S ′ new rules, hence, S b is a deductive extension of S ′ , and, therefore, we can extend (9):
Moreover, due to R b ⊆ R(S b ), from (10) we have
And from (7), (11) and by (1), (4)
that is, S b is a deductive extension ofS. Proof of (b). By assumption, rules R b do not form a relative base for S ′ ,that is,
Now, we only need to establish that S b and ⟨Ax ′ ,R(S ′ )⟩ have the same logic. Indeed, by the assumption of the theorem, rules R b are admissible in S ′ , so
and, therefore, by (14) and (2)
Conversely, suppose that rules R b form a relative base of admissible rules in every deductive extension of S admitting rules R b . We need to show thatS is HSCpl, that is, that its every deductive extension is structurally complete.
Assume that S
⟩ is a deductive extension ofS. Then by (1) and by (4) ,
Let us recall that rules R b are admissible in S and, therefore, R b ⊆ R(S) and, by the assumption, S ′ is a deductive extension ofS, so,
(17) means, that rules R b are derivable in S ′ , and S ′ is structurally complete due to all rules from a relative base (of admissible in S ′ rules) are derivable in S ′ .
Example 4.10. In [22] Rybakov described the class of all axiomatic extensions of IPC admitting all rules from IPC. In the Section 5.1 we discuss this class in more details.
Hereditarily Structural Complete Extensions of superintuitionistic logics
In this section we study hereditary structural completeness of deductive extensions of IPC. All hereditarily structural complete axiomatic extensions of IPC (that is, the deductive systems of type ⟨Ax i + Ax , mp⟩). The set HSC of hereditarily structural complete axiomatic extensions of IPC (and of K4 for this matter) has rather nice properties:
(a) HSC is countably infinite; (b) every deductive system from HSC is finitely axiomatizable; (c) HSC contains the least (relative to ⪅) deductive system. As we will see, in a general case the situation is more complex, namely, none of the above properties holds (see Corollary 5.3 below). Failure of (c) also entails that the criteria similar to ones established in [9] and [23] , are impossible. In this section, we focus on hereditary structural completions of the standard superintuitionistic logics listed in the Table 1.
Hereditary Structural Completeness of Int + Visser Rules.
First, we establish that IPC is hereditarily structurally complete, and then we will consider some deductive extensions of IPC. Proof. It was established in [14, Theorem 3.20 ] that Visser's rules V n , n > 0 are admissible in IPC, and it was observed in [15, Theorem 3.9] that Visser's rules form a base of admissible rules in every deductive extension of IPC which admits them. Hence, we can apply Theorem 4.9 and complete the proof.
Recall that Visser's rules are admissible in KC and M n (see [ Rybakov observed [22, Theorem 7] that there is continuum many intermediate logics admitting all rules admissible in IPC. Hence, there is continuum many not logically equivalent deductive systems in which all Visser's rules are admissible. Thus, the following holds.
Corollary 5.3. There is continuum many not logically equivalent HSCpl deductive systems (extending IN T ). Therefore, there are not finitely axiomatizable HSCpl deductive systems (extending IN T ).
In the following section we will prove that there is continuum many structural completions of of superintuitionistic logics that are not hereditarily structurally complete.
Hereditary Structural Completeness: The Algebraic View.
Generally speaking, there are two ways to prove that a deductive system S is not structurally complete: to present an admissible in S and not Sderivable rule, or to use semantic means. It is known (see e.g. [19] ) that each (finitely algebraizable in sense of Blok and Pigozzi [3] ) deductive system corresponds to a quasivariety of algebras which are models for this system. In this Section we use the second approach to show that there is continuum many superintuitionistic logics, whose structural completion is not HSCpl. But first, we need to recall some notions and facts from the theory of quasivarieties.
Basic facts from theory of quasivarieties. Let us recall some basic notions about models of superintuitionistic logics. As usual, we use Heyting algebras 3 as models for superintuitionistic logics. A bounded distributive lattice ⟨A; ∧, ∨, 0, 1⟩ with relative pseudocomplementation → is called a Heyting algebra (see e.g. [4, Section II]), and we abbreviate a → 0 as ¬a. A formula A is refuted in a given (Heyting) algebra A, if there is a valuation ν in A such that ν(A) ≠ 1. Otherwise A is said to be valid in A. A rule r ∶= A 1 , . . . , A n B is refuted in a given algebra A, if there is a valuation ν in A such that ν(A i ) = 1 for all i = 1, . . . , n, but ν(B) ≠ 1. Otherwise r is said to be valid in A. Given a set of formulas Γ and a formula A (or set of rules R and a rule r) we say that an algebra A separates A from Γ (or that A separates r from R), if A refutes A while all formulas from Γ are valid in A (if A refutes r, while all rules from R are valid in A).
With each superintuitionistic deductive system S ∶= ⟨Ax , R⟩ one can associate a quasivariety Q(S) of all algebras in which all axioms and all rules of S are valid 4 . Moreover, given two deductive systems S 1 , S 2 ,
and, hence, S 1 ≈ S 2 if and only if Q(S 1 ) = Q(S 2 ). And for every quasivariety Q there is a deductive system S such that Q = Q(S).
Let S be a deductive system, Q(S) be a corresponding quasivariety, and F Q(S) (ω) be a free algebra of quasivariety Q(S).
If Q is a quasivariety, we say thatQ ∶= Q(F Q (ω)) is a structural completion of quasivariety Q. A quasivariety Q is primitive [11] if each its subquasivariety is a relative variety, that is, for each subquasivariety
There is correspondence between hereditarily structurally complete deductive systems and primitive quasivarieties.
Proposition 5.4. (Comp. e.g. [19, Corollary 7.15]) A deductive system S is hereditarily structurally complete if and only if Q(S) is primitive.

Thus, if for a deductive system S its structural completion is HSCpl if and only ifQ(S) is primitive.
Let Q be a quasivariety and A ∈ Q be a non-trivial finite algebra. A is said to be Q-irreducible, if A is not (isomorphic to) a subdirect product of algebras from Q having less elements then A. And A is said to be weakly Q-projective, if A embeds in every its homomorphic preimage from Q (comp. [11] ). And we say that an algebra A is totally non-projective, if A is not weakly projective in the quasivariety Q(A) it generates. It is easy to see that a totally non-projective algebra is not weekly Q-projective in any quasivariety Q it belongs to. is totally non-projective. Figure 1 . Example of totally non-projective algebra.
Let us note the following simple but nevertheless helpful proposition.
Proposition 5.6. Any quasivariety containing a totally non-projective algebra is not primitive.
Corollary 5.7. A quasivariety generated by a cyclic Heyting algebra C 2m+1 of cardinality 2m + 1 is not primitive for any m ≥ 5.
Proof. The proof immediately follows from the observation that for every m ≥ 5 cyclic algebra C 2m+5 contains a subalgebra (isomorphic to) C ′ 7 , which is totally non-projective.
Let Q be a quasivariety. Recall that Q is called locally finite if every finitely-generated algebra from Q is finite.
We will use the following criterion of primitiveness of locally finite quasivarieties from [11, Proposition 5.1.24].
Proposition 5.8. A locally finite quasivariety Q is primitive if and only if every finite subdirectly Q-irreducible algebra is weakly projective in Q.
Thus, due to Propositions 5.4 and 5.8, in order to prove that a deductive system is not hereditarily structurally complete, it is enough to show that Q(S) contains a Q-irreducible algebra that is not weakly Q-projective, provided that Q(S) is locally finite. In the following sections we use this approach to establish that there are continuum many deductive system that are not hereditarily structurally complete.
Quasivarieties generated by finite cyclic algebras. First, let us consider the infinite cyclic Heyting algebra RN -the Rigier-Nishimura ladder. Let us observe that RN is a subalgebra of F H (ω). Since H, regarded as quasivariety, corresponds to IPC and we know that IPC is HSCpl, we can conclude that Q(F H (ω)) is a primitive quasivariety, hence, its subquasivariety generated by RN is also primitive. In other words, Proposition 5.9. The structural completion of the logic of RN is HSCpl.
Before we turn to the quasivarieties generated by finite cyclic algebras, let us prove the following simple proposition which will be instrumental in what follows. Let A be an n-generated algebra and V be a variety generated by A. Then,
Also, due to every quasivariety contains free algebras, Q(F V (ω)) is the least (relative ⊆) subquasivariety of V that generates V. Hence, we only need to verify that F V (n) generates V. Since F V (n) ∈ V, all identities valid in V are valid in F V (n), and we need to show that if an identity τ is refuted in V, then τ is refuted in F V (n) too. Indeed, suppose τ is an identity refuted in V. Then, due to A generates V, this identity is refuted in A. Recall that A is n-generated and, hence, A is a homomorphic image of F V (n). Hence, τ cannot be valid in F V (n). Now, let us turn to the quasivarieties generated by finite cyclic algebras. First, we recall that if A is a finite algebra, then quasivariety Q(A) is locally finite, and any non-trivial finite Q(A)-irreducible algebra is embedded in A (see e.g. [11, Proposition 3.1.6]). Secondly, by Proposition 5.10, if A is cyclic, that is, A is generated by a single element,
Thus, if A is cyclic, in order to establish that Q(F Q(A) (ω)) is primitive it is necessary and sufficient to verify that every Q(
Let C n , n > 1 denotes a cyclic Heyting algebra having n elements. Then the following holds. Proof. The primitiveness of Q(C n ) for n = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 follows immediately from the criterion from [9] . By Corollary 5.7, Q(C 2k+1 ) for all k ≥ 5 are not primitive.
Let us prove that Q(C 2k ) for all k ≥ 8 are not primitive, and this will leave us only with cases n = 10, 12, 14.
• The above proof holds for any algebra C 2k for any k ≥ 8. The cases n = 10, 12, 14 can be checked by listing all the Q-irreducible subalgebras of respective algebras and verifying that all of them are weakly Q-projective. Proof. Let V be a variety and F V (1) has n elements and n > 13. Then, by Theorem 5.11, Q(F V (1)) is not primitive. So, Q(F V (ω)) is not primitive, because Q(F V (1)) is a subquasivariety of Q(F V (ω)).
In other words, the following holds. Proof. The proof follows from the known fact that for n > 3 cyclic Lindenbaum algebra of BD n is finite and has more then 14 elements. Now, we can prove the main theorem of this section. theorem 5.14. There is continuum many superintuitionistic logic structurally completion of which is not HSCpl.
Proof. We will use Corollaries 5.13 and 5.12 and construct continuum many varieties free cyclic algebras of which contain more then 13 elements. We will use the Jankov's argument: let N 2 be a set of all natural numbers greater than 2 and let us consider algebras A m , m ∈ N 2 corresponding to frames A m depicted at Fig.2 . Let I be an arbitrary set of N 2 , and let V I be a variety generated by algebras A m , m ∈ I. Observe that C 16 is a homomorphic image of algebras A m , hence F V I (1) has at least 16 elements. On the other hand, algebra C 19 -the cyclic algebra with 19 elements -is not embedded in either of algebras A m , m ∈ I or their homomorphic images. Hence, the characteristic formula X(C 19 ) (see [16] ) of C 19 is valid in each A m , m ∈ I and, hence, X(C 19 ) is valid in V I . Thus, C 19 ∉ V I , and this means that F V I (1) is finite, because C 19 is a homomorphic image of RN, i.e. RN ∉ V I . So, we have established that F V I (1) is finite and has at least 16 elements. It is clear that there is continuum many subsets of N 2 and all we need is to prove that I uniquely defines V I , that is, we need to prove that if I 1 , I 2 ⊆ N 2 and I 1 ≠ I 2 , then V I 1 ≠ V I 2 . But the latter follows from the properties of characteristic formulas (see [16] )) and the observation that if n ≠ m, algebra A n is not embedded in any homomorphic image of A m .
5.3.
Absence of the Least HSCpl Deductive System. The goal of this Section is to demonstrate that there is not the least hereditarily complete deductive system extending IPC and, hence, the criterion similar to the one from [9] , is impossible. Proof. First, observe that IPC is a minimal (relative to ⪅) hereditarily structurally deductive system extending IPC. Indeed, all systems between IPC and IPC have the same logic, namely Int. Thus, except for IPC, all these systems are not even structurally complete. So, it is enough to present a HSCpl deductive system S such that S that is not an extension of IPC.
Let L 7 be a set of all formulas valid in C 7 -cyclic Heyting algebra with 7 elements and ket S 7 ∶= ⟨L 7 , mp⟩. We will prove that the following holds (a)S 7 is hereditarily structurally complete; (b) IPC ⪅S 7 . Proof of (a). First, note thatS 7 , as any structural completion, is trivially structurally complete, and we only need to demonstrate that all its proper extensions are structurally complete. But every proper extension ofS 7 has a logic that is a proper extension of L 7 , and in [9] it had been proven that all such logics are even hereditarily structurally complete.
Proof of (b). Recall from [7] that the following substitution instance of Visser's rule V 1 (also known as generalized Mints' rule) is admissible in IPC:
Therefore, M is derivable in IPC and all its extensions. At the same time, this rule is not admissible in L 7 : take p 1 = ¬¬q, p 2 = ¬q, and r = (¬¬q → q).
On one hand, we have
On the other hand, we have
because by the Glivenko Theorem, the above formula is equal in IPC to the following formula (¬¬q → q) ∨ ¬¬q ∨ ¬q, and the latter formula is not valid in C 7 , that is, it is not a theorem of L 7 . So, we have established that rule M is derivable in IP C and is not derivable inL 7 , which proves (b).
5.4.
Hereditary Structural Incompleteness of KP and ML. Recall that KP denotes Kreisel-Putnam's logic and ML denotes Medvedev's logic. In this Section we to prove that KP is not hereditarily structurally complete (structural incompleteness of KP was observed in [28] ). The author is grateful to E. Jeřábek who suggested the idea of the proof. First, we recall that ML is structurally complete, due to [21] , ML is structurally complete, that is, every admissible in ML rule is derivable in it. Hence,
In [17] Levin had constructed a class F ○ of formulas 5 that posses the following property. So, in a way, ML is reduced to KP. Let us consider how such reduction is linked to admissibility.
Reducibility of Deductive Systems. Let S 1 and S 2 be deductive systems and Σ be a set of substitutions. Then S 1 is Σ-reducible to S 2 if for any formula A, Proof. Suppose a rule r is admissible in S 2 . We need to prove that r is admissible in S 1 . For this we prove the inverse statement: if r is not admissible in S 1 , then r is not admissible in S 2 . Suppose rule r ∶= A 1 , . . . , A n B is not admissible in S 1 . Then there is a substitution σ such that
Since ⊬ S 1 B, Σ-reducibility entails that there is a substitution σ
On the other hand, Σ-reducibility entails that for every i = 1, . . . , n
And (22) and (21) 
Now, we can use (19) and obtain
And (24) means that every admissible in KP rule is derivable in ML. 5 The definition of this class is irrelevant for our purposes, but the reader can find it in [17] .
Recall also (see [9] ), that ML is not hereditarily structurally complete. Hence, by Corollary 5.18 and (24), we have Corollary 5.20. KP is not hereditarily structurally complete.
5.5.
Hereditary Structural Completeness and Finite Model Property. In this Section we show that there is continuum many hereditarily structurally complete deductive systems that cannot be defined by their finite models, which is different from the situation with deductive systems with mp as a single inference rule.
A logic L is said to have the finite model property (fmp for short) if for every formula A ∉ L there is a finite model of L in which A is refuted. A logic L has the finite model property relative to admissibility (a-fmp for short), if for every rule r not admissible in L there is a finite model of L in which all admissible in L rules are valid and r is not valid, that is, there is a finite model of ⟨L, mp⟩ that refutes r. In other words, S has the a-fmp if each rule valid in every finite model ofS is admissible in S.
In [22] Rybakov described all superintutionistic logics enjoying a-fmp. In [12, Section 3.6] Goudsmit presented some classes of superintuitionistic logics that do not have the a-fmp. The normal modal logics with and without the a-fmp are studied in [25, 26] .
In this Section we establish connections between a-fmp and hereditary structural completeness. Proof. First, recall that the generalized Mints rule M is a substitution instance of V 1 , hence, admissibility of V 1 entails admissibility of M . Now, we can apply [8, Corollary 2] and conclude that all admissible in Int rules, and, therefore, all Visser's rules are valid in every finite model ofS. Since S enjoys the a-fmp, all Visser's rules are admissible inS, and this means thatS is a deductive extension of IPC. By Theorem 5.1, IPC is hereditarily structurally complete, so,S is hereditarily structurally complete.
Let us note that a-fmp is a property of structural completion of a deductive system S rather than property of S per se. This is to say that, any two logically equivalent deductive systems either both have the a-fmp, or both do not have the a-fmp. Hence, if a deductive system S ∶= ⟨Ax , R⟩ enjoys the a-fmp, then deductive system ⟨L(S), mp⟩ enjoys the a-fmp. The Theorem 7 of [22] (see also [24, Theorem 6.3.5] ) states that there is continuum many deductive extensions of IPC. On the other hand, there is only countable many hereditarily structural complete superintuitionistic logics (see e.g. [24, Theorem 5.4.10] ). Hence, the following holds.
Corollary 5.22. There is continuum many hereditarily structural complete deductive systems without the a-fmp. 5.6. Open Problems. In conclusion, let us point out some open problems. We start with decidability of hereditary structural completeness that may be presented in two different ways. Problem 1. Is there an algorithm that, given a formula A, decides whether the structural completion of ⟨Ax i + A, mp⟩ is hereditarily structural complete? Problem 2. Is there an algorithm that, given a finite Heyting algebra A, decides whether the structural completion of logic of A (that is, the structural completion of ⟨L(A), mp⟩) is hereditarily structural complete?
Since structural completion of IPC is HSCpl, the following problem is important.
Problem 3.
Is there an algorithm that, given a formula A, decides whether the logic ⟨Ax i + A, mp⟩ admits all admissible in IPC rules (i.e. admits all Visser's rules)?
Let us note that, due to Theorem 6.3.6 from [24] , there is an algorithm that, given a finite Heyting algebra A, decides whether logic L(A) admits all Visser's rules.
Problem 4.
Is there an algorithm that, given a finite Heyting algebra A, decides whether a deductive system defined by A is hereditarily structural complete? In other words, is there an algorithm that, given a finite Heyting algebra A, decides whether quasivariety Q(A) is primitive?
Let us observe that in spite of Proposition 5.10, the positive answer to Problem 4 entails a positive answer to Problem 2.
